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Abstract 
The author emphasises that the development of human rights has not been achieved by one 
or more concrete religions but by a universal religion of humanity; this is illustrated with a 
South-African example, Desmond Tutu. Human Rights are not the result of a religion, or 
of Christian faith, but the fundamental basis of religion; it is a religious consciousness that 
was given initially to human beings. The emergence of human rights shows that people 
from all cultures all over the world can agree to humanistic beliefs like an inherent dignity 
to which every human being is entitled. This contribution attempts the mediation of the 
universality of human rights with the particularity of religious traditions. 
The particularity of religious traditions and the universality of 
human rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1948) did not emerge from any con­
crete religion, not even from Christianity and its churches. Its starting point was 
the experience of pain and harm, the experience of brutal non-recognition, "bar­
barous acts" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Preamble). The cries 
of those deprived of their right to live by the totalitarian regimes of National So­
cialism and Stalinism, of those tormented, tortured, and killed because of racial, 
national, political or religious reasons or because of their sexuality, can still be 
heard in the declaration. Even today, it is the violations of human rights that pro­
vide the appeal to keep and enforce them. Yet, this is only possible because such 
rights have a global status as a universally valid norm under international law and 
were turned into enforceable rights in the constitutions of many countries. If a bla­
tant violation becomes public anywhere in the world, one will immediately appeal 
to human rights. 
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For this reason, the defense and enforcement of human rights is often sus­
pected of acting in a cultural-imperialistic way. Furthermore, when wars are de­
clared under the pretext that they contribute to supporting human rights - although 
in reality the main interest is more mundane, e.g., rights to oil production - these 
suspicions are clearly supported. Hence, human rights are often understood as 
a continuation of western colonialism. Nevertheless, it must be said that only 
through an intervention in the affairs of a state that either threats the security of its 
citizens or is not able to ensure it, legitimated by international law, is it possible 
to prevent further violations. 
The question is whether international interventions for the enforcement of hu­
man rights - especially if they induce a military conflict that creates additional 
more harm - have cultural-imperialistic features, even if the intention for such is 
good. This question opens a quite difficult issue because the intention behind such 
interventions to enforce the human rights is the claim of a universal validity. A 
theological concept of Desmond Tutu offers a good example how to deal theolog­
ically with the tension between the universal validity of the human rights and the 
particularity of religious traditions. Tutu shows us that the African concept of an 
ubuntu-theology provides a special possibility to convey an African understand­
ing of being human with the Christian concept of human dignity and the universal 
normativity of the declaration of human rights as well. 
The ubuntu-theology of Desmond Tutu addressing the human right 
debate 
Desmond Tutu's book God is not a Christian is a collection of sermons, speeches 
and statements from the former Anglican bishop of Cape Town. In a sermon de­
livered in the church of St. Martin in The Fields near Trafalgar-Square in London, 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and at the end of apartheid in South Africa, Tutu 
insisted "God is clearly not a Christian. His concern is for all his children" (Tutu 
2012, 12). 
For Tutu, there is no conflict between human rights' universal validity and 
the obligation of Christians to speak up for human rights out of their Christian 
belief. This is not because Christianity might have invented human rights and their 
worldwide distribution would be more successful under the Christian prefix. Such 
a cultural imperialistic interpretation of the relationship between human rights and 
Christianity was far from what Tutu had in mind. It was rather his deep concern 
to win over all religions in the universal enforcement of human rights, something 
that marked his global speaking and preaching since the 1980's. 
Tutu confesses his Christian faith in strong terms. He often underlines that it 
is essential for him to take his own faith seriously. Yet, taking his own religion 
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seriously does not mean devaluing other religions or refusing to believe in the 
idea of a natural universal religion that is inherent in the very nature of human 
beings from the beginning. Religions are different; the Gods in whom they be­
lieve are different. Despite all that they have something in common: they reveal a 
transcendent element in humanity. 
"God is clearly not a Christian. His concern is for all his children." Christians do not have 
an exclusive relationship to God, and God has no exclusive relationship to Christians. 
He is the God of all human beings and they have their different relations to him. This 
also is important to Tutu: religions are not identical; "the" God can be understood in 
many different ways. As God is never without the individual relation, "we must hold 
to our particular and peculiar beliefs tenaciously" (Tutu 2012, 6). Tutu combines these 
confessions with a religious individuality through the opinion that God generally could 
only be thought of and believed in through the different relationships people have with 
Him. God is only God in the plurality of individuar religious perspectives about Him. For 
relations among religions, Tutu stresses, this means that "we must be ready to learn from 
another, not claiming that we alone possess all truth and that somehow we have a corner 
on God" (Tutu 2012, 6). 
By acting in this way we will discover many things we have in common. What 
we actually have in common depends on what that for which we search. For Tutu 
the direction is clear. For him all religions have a transcendent referent that is 
compassionate and concerned; all see human beings as "creatures of this supreme, 
supra-mundane reality, with a high destiny that hopes for an everlasting life lived 
in close association with the divine" (Tutu 2012, 7). This distinction of human 
beings as "creatures" of a higher reality in "close association with the divine" is 
what Tutu hopes to find as the common ground of the different religions. Each 
human being is holy; thus, it would be a taboo to hurt her or him. 
Tutu is delighted that he finds this holiness of human beings in the Christian 
tradition as well. "Surely, it is good to know that God (in the Christian tradition) 
created us all (not just Christians) in his image, thus investing us all with infinite 
worth" (Tutu 2012, 7). It is equally important for Tutu to emphasise that just like 
Christianity other religious traditions regard human beings with holiness as well: 
Surely we can rejoice that the eternal word, the Logos of God, enlightens everyone - not 
just Christians, but everyone who comes into the world; that what we call the Spirit of God 
is not a Christian preserve, for the Spirit of God existed long before there were Christians, 
inspiring and nurturing women and men in the ways of holiness, bringing them to fruition, 
bringing them to fruition what was best in all. We do scant justice and honour to our God 
if we want, for instance, to deny that Mahatma Gandhi was a truly great soul, a holy man 
who walks closely with God. Our God would be too small if he was not also the God of 
Gandhi (Tutu 2012, 7). 
Christianity is neither allowed to claim to be the religion that discovered the ho-
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liness of human beings (which would also be historically inaccurate), nor is it 
allowed to claim that Christianity alone is the best and only vehicle for the pro­
motion of humanity's holiness. The access to the "holy sanctuary" of humanity 
and work towards the preservation of this sanctuary can be found in other reli­
gious teachings as well. 
Tutu is obviously illustrating that religion - and the relation between human­
ity and the transcendent - are expressed in various ways within different religions. 
Each religion has its own specific way to express this relation. Today many reli­
gions are even respectful of people who have abandoned their original religious 
affiliation or who do not believe in God. 
Religion provocatively insists that one has dignity simply because one is a 
human being, regardless of one's characteristics or affiliations, independent from 
one's deeds or misdeeds. Religion shifts one's being into an unconditioned hori­
zon. One's right to exist derives from conditions that are independent of oneself. 
A human being is not able to and does not have to earn this right. One's right to 
exist is derived from something that is beyond oneself, it derives from God. In 
Christian discourse this means that a person is God's creature, his beloved child, 
and a justified sinner. But Tutu only speaks rarely and cautiously in this biblical 
language. Tutu counts on a transversal theology to which all humans with good 
will are responding. This transversal theology articulates the truly religious matter 
in all religions, i.e., religion sees the individual human being from the perspective 
of a self-transcended humanity founded in the Unconditioned. Religion is a tran­
scendent determination of human existence that, then in a twist, revokes itself and 
gives humanity back to itself. 
Tutu's theology used such common religious language, compelling even for 
secular people, in referring to the "essential humanity of the perpetrator of even 
the most gruesome atrocity" (Tutu 2012, 42) in his plead for a path of reconcil­
iation. He could have spoken about the public-political force of Christian belief 
in reconciliation. Instead he makes recourse to the "essential humanity" even of 
"the perpetrator." He notes that no one could deny the human dignity of a person, 
however heinous his deed. This is a reformulation of a religious interpretation of 
human rights discourse from Tutu's Christian orientation. Tutu emphasises that 
the evidences of what religion generally contributes to human life and society 
show religion indispensable in the realisation of humanity. 
In this way the path of restorative justice should become passable for people 
who come from other non-Christian, religious worldviews too. Tutu specifically 
points towards the African worldview of the ubuntu. Ubuntu is a Xhosa-word that 
expresses the essential individual's affiliation to a community. Ubuntu also stands 
for the transcending of each individual human being in a larger, infinite reaching 
reality. For the community of ubuntu, the being of an individual is not only linked 
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to the visible tribal community but also to the ancestors. The African worldview 
of ubuntu, together with the idea that human beings are made in God's image 
found in the Hebrew Bible, and the Christian understanding of the unconditioned 
justification of the sinner, together represent for Tutu an integral expression of a 
natural theology grounding the universal validity of the human rights (cf. Tutu 
2012, 21 -24). 
Everyone of God's human creatures has the capacity to know something about 
God from the evidence God leaves in his handiworks (Romans 1 :  1 8-20); this is the 
basis for natural theology and natural law. Immanuel Kant spoke about categorical 
imperative. All human creatures have a sense that some things ought to be done 
just as others not to be done. This is a universal phenomenon - what varies is the 
content of natural law. [ . . .  ] In his speech before the Areopagus, Paul speaks about 
how God created all human beings from one st0ck and given everyone the urge, 
the hunger, for divine things so that all will seek after God and perhaps find him, 
adding that God is not far from us since all (not just Christians) live and move and 
have their being in him (Act. 1 7: 22-31). Talking to pagans, Paul declares that all 
are God's offspring (Tutu 2012, 1 0). 
In Tutu's theology the "universal phenomenon" is the phenomenon of a re­
ligious consciousness that was given initially to each human being. This reli­
gious consciousness becomes concrete in openness to transcendence: searching 
for and questioning something that is beyond oneself. Particular religions build 
themselves up on this natural religion. But they also presuppose this natural reli­
gion as the universal resonance chamber that outlives their own history. Natural 
religion exists in the particular religions but not exclusively. There is one universal 
faith in all concrete religions that acts through and beyond them, a faith that we 
should by all means call: the faith in human rights. 
Although Tutu has not articulated it in such an explicit way, it seems implied 
by his argumentation in the way he describes the particular, concrete religions -
and not only Christianity - by interrogating their contribution to the enforcement 
of human rights. Doing this he tries to see the best in each of them as something 
that serves the humanity of human beings. 
We must not make the mistake of judging other faiths by their least attractive 
features and adherents: It is possible to demolish the case for Christianity by, for 
instance, quoting the Crusades, or the atrocities of the Holocaust, or the excess of 
apartheid. But we know that that would be unfair in the extreme, since we claim 
them to be aberrations, distortions and deviations. What about Francis of Assisi, 
Mother Teresa, Albert Schweitzer, and all the wonderful and beautiful people and 
things that belong to Christianity? We should want to deal with other faiths and 
their best and highest, as they define themselves, and not shoot down the carica­
tures that we want to put up (Tutu 2012, 16). 
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A cultural transformation and adaption is in fact what happened at the begin­
ning and merged in the process of placing the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in different cultural and religious traditions. The process is not at all com­
pleted and is, with regard to religion, often controversial because the role of reli­
gion in human rights discourse often becomes closely related to specific religions. 
Then one often sees oneself quickly involved in a very ambivalent history. One 
has to confess that Christian churches accepted the idea of human rights quite late 
and even today are often accused of not advocating for human rights very strongly. 
Religions have their own legal orders that can lead to conflicts with national law 
and even with human rights, especially in cases where human rights have en­
tered into state legal systems. Yet a theology like the transversal natural theology 
of Desmond Tutu enables us to make explicit that a religious faith constitutively 
belongs to human beings. The transversal natural theology of Tutu is his ubuntu­
theology. In the context of this ubuntu-theology it is possible to register the faith 
based implications of the declarations of human rights from their beginning, i.e., 
we can call the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the confessional base of a 
universal belief on Human Rights. Tutu's concept of an ubuntu-theology combines 
elements of an African ethics of humanity with a non-exclusive understanding of 
the Christian implications of human rights. 
The mediation of the universal validity of human rights with the 
particularity of religious traditions 
It must be generally accepted that, on the one hand, human rights require self­
determined values and on the other they support certain values that are not equally 
appreciated and practiced in all cultures and religions around the world. Next to 
the universal claim of the validity of the human rights, cultural and religious differ­
ences will also continue to exist. Religious ties supply these values with a strong 
potential of motivation for daily living. All religious cultures are different in what 
they consider law and rights and in how they appreciate individual choice with 
regard to sexual orientation and the choice of partnership, profession and resi­
dence. One can find many different cultural opinions about the relation between 
the individual and the community, about the idea of physical integrity, about who 
takes precedence in the relation of individual and community and in the hierar­
chy of individual and community (e.g., family, clan, and nation). They might all 
be different but at the same time, they all have a religious foundation. Likewise, 
one will find different but always religiously founded opinions about the idea of 
equality of men and women, about religious tolerance or about the estimation of 
democratic participation. 
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During the drafting phase of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
UN-Commission already knew that there was great tension between a universal 
normativity of human rights and the pluralism of all the different religious cul­
tures. In his book on human rights' genealogy, sociologist Hans Joas offers a 
helpful insight into the work of the UN-Commission, comprised of delegates from 
18 nations (cf. Joas 2012, 251-281, 273f). He especially focuses on two particular 
delegates, i.e., the Lebanese representative Charles Malik and the Chinese repre­
sentative Peng-Chun Chang. Charles Malik, speaker for the Arabian world, was 
an orthodox Christian whereas Pen-Chun Chang, according to Joas, often referred 
to his Confucian background during the drafting process. Yet Pen-Chun Chang 
was also the person who warned on the one hand against a foundation for the hu­
man rights that is limited to reason and on the other against a special emphasis 
of one single religious tradition. He was interested in a synthesis of all the dif­
ferent religious traditions of vindication into one common value system. This is 
consistent with the fact that there is no reference to a universal ratio of humans 
but to a universal "faith" in a human religious' conviction, i.e., "the faith in fun­
damental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person" (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Preamble). 1 As Hannah Arendt2 interpreted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' fundamental claim, it proclaims the 
human rights movement as something like a religious movement, as a movement 
that is based on a confession of faith, faith in the possibility of creating conditions 
around the world that gives every human being access to the right, to have basic 
rights as a human being, especially to be acknowledged as a human being. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the work of people from dif­
ferent contexts, cultures, religions and parts of the world. What becomes evident 
is that this declaration never would have gained such popularity if it was not to a 
large extent compatible with the different value systems that are practiced in the 
different religions, cultures and contexts in so many different ways. Still, what 
remains important is the question of who will take charge when the concrete re­
ligions and cultural traditions merge to be mediated through the normative moral 
claims of theUniversal Declaration of Human Right. Will it be the normative uni­
versality of human rights with its attempt to find recognition as official rights? Or 
will it be the particular religious traditions who only want to assign human rights 
1 Jan Smuts was responsible for the drafting of the United-Nations Charter's preamble and penned 
these words. Smuts was head of the South-African government several times in the 1930s and 
the early I 940s although he was not responsible directly for the policy of racial apartheid, en­
acted in the same year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1948). 
2 Cf. Hannah Arendt, Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht. In Die Wandlung 4, Dezember 
1949. 
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to own fellow believers as they think them to be maintained according to their 
own norms of faith this way? 
There is no doubt, that the validity of universal human rights has to be trans­
mitted in accordance with the self-understanding of particular and regional reli­
gious cultures and contexts. To a certain extent, to establish a motivational basis 
for action, human rights have to incarnate in the minds and hearts of people in 
the different contexts, cultures and religions. Therefore, one speaks of a necessary 
cultural-contextual synthesis and value generalisation in human rights discourse. 
Yet, in this process of synthesis and generalisation it has to be ensured that hu­
man rights remain intact and inviolable and that states and societies follow their 
requirements. Cultural-contextual synthesis and value generalisation will only be 
helpful if they support the enforcement of human rights within historical reli­
gions, and if the human rights find recognition in the particular religions and in 
the cultures and contexts that are merged with them. This will have practical con­
sequences for religious as well as for judicial practice in the countries in which 
human rights claim validity. 
First of all, this means that religious cultures have to legitimise themselves 
according to the standards of human rights and not vice versa. Religions, their 
practices and legal interpretations have to prove themselves to be compatible with 
human rights. Secondly, one has to insist on the validity of human rights, in par­
ticular on the right to self-determination, even if they are opposed to religious 
ideas of morality. When the human right for self-determination, for justice and 
security is valid in a state, these rights have to be valid for all people, independent 
of their religious denomination or ethnicity, even if this right might contradict the 
norms of a religious community, for instance freedom of sexual expression and 
self-identification. 
The universal validity of human rights can hardly be enforced without con­
flicts with religious and political powers. Hence this religion will be all the more 
vigorous the more states implement human rights into their constitutions and the 
more people are committed to human rights. People might come from concrete 
religions, they might stay in contact with them or just pass them by, but they are 
all connected in a worldwide community with the same spirit of something like 
a universal confession of human rights. It is also clear that faith in the holiness 
of every human being, confessed by the global movement of human rights, will 
gradually change the different religions. It is a faith in the holiness of the human 
being - not a human being formed and acting in thus and such a way, but of each 
human being just the way she or he already exists. This faith alone will change 
the world. It changes the world through the way that justice in the sense of love, 
mercy and forgiveness are practiced, that there will be help where people are vie-
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timised by violence and state terror, where hungry people suffer from starvation 
and have to escape from their home countries. 
Many things need to be done from this perspective. Without the implementa­
tion of human rights into the constitutions of states and the enforcement of their 
validity under international law, much less would have been achieved towards a 
more human world. Yet, all this effort is based on a faith in the holiness of the 
human being. It is this faith that encourages people to fight for adherence to and 
enforcement of human rights, whether they are members of a religious community 
or not. 
However, it should be underscored that people with religious backgrounds and 
motivations, just like Desmond Tutu, do fight for human rights worldwide - and so 
do with theological reasons. Tutu's ubuntu-theology realises an integration of dif­
ferent religious traditions by itself. Doing so this theological concept establishes a 
theological base upon which the universal validity of human dignity is religiously 
grounded. 
In conclusion, the possible impact of an ubuntu-theology on the practice 
of churches and Christian communities could become obvious. At the end the 
ubuntu-theology of Desmond Tutu gives the format of a theological base for an 
active collaboration of Christian communities with NGO's on human rights issues. 
It also stimulates churches and Christian communities to offer room and financial 
help to human right groups. 
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